

UNKNOWN ACTION

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Kissinger Heavily Guarded Following Reports of Plot

Intelligence reports of a plot to kill Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger during his trip through Europe and the Middle East have stimulated unusual security precautions, the State Department confirmed yesterday.

When Kissinger's Air Force plane reached London's Heathrow Airport yesterday it was cordoned off by American guards armed with submachine guns and by British police, some with guard dogs. Kissinger was taken from the airport in a heavily guarded motorcade as soon as the aircraft landed.

Officials in Washington said that information was received from abroad before he left Saturday on a two-week journey that an attempt to assassinate Kissinger was being plotted by Palestinian terrorists.

According to these sources, the foreign intelligence in-

formation was that "a team of terrorists" was involved and movements of personnel had been detected. Some published reports yesterday said suspicion centered on the group known as the "Black September" extremists. One informed U.S. source, however, said the suspects could not necessarily be identified by that name because Palestine terrorists frequently have switched names of such groups.

Newsman accompanying Kissinger to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization conference in Brussels first noted the exceptionally heavy security screen around him.

State Department spokesman John F. King confirmed that there was a threat on his life. I can't go into all the details. I think you will understand why. Obviously all the appropriate precautions have

been taken," King said that based on the information we received, the sources from which it came, we had to take it seriously—quite seriously.

The price of celebrity," King noted, "is that you can become a target for radical, irrational elements, and the prudent thing is to take appropriate safeguard."

King said the reported plot was against the person of the Secretary, rather than a plan to hijack his plane, and "it would have been while he was traveling."

Secret Service agents as well as State Department security guards are accompanying Kissinger on this trip, in standard practice since he became Secretary of State, King said, with the Secret Service in charge. Kissinger has Secret Service protection because of his position as President Nixon's national security adviser, but officials said the

State Department is scheduled to take over full responsibility of his security in January.

Kissinger is scheduled to arrive in Cairo on Dec. 13, and also to visit Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria before arriving in Tel Aviv on Dec. 6.

The Arab nations generally have warmly welcomed Kissinger as the key intermediary for reinforcing the Arab-Israeli cease-fire and laying the groundwork for the Arab-Israeli peace talks scheduled to start in Geneva on Dec. 18. They expect Kissinger, who is Jewish, to be able to obtain considerable concessions from Israel for a peace settlement.

There has been intense dispute, however, over who should represent the Palestinians in a peace settlement with some of the extremists also bitterly opposed to the terms for the present cease

fire. The overall group responsibility for terrorist acts sending various Palestinian units is the Palestinian Liberation Organization led by Yasser Arafat, which denies re-

sponsibility for terrorist acts outside of Palestine, and is expected to play a role in the Geneva conference. But the PLO also represents many dis-

sident guerrilla forces. Any group planning to assassinate Kissinger presumably would be set on destroying the im-

pending conference.

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THE EVENING STAR

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Kissinger Guarded After Threat

By Oswald Johnston
Star-News Staff Writer

Fear of an assassination plot, reportedly by members of Black September, the Palestinian terrorist organization, has led administration officials to order unusually stringent security measures for Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's current trip to Europe and the Middle East.

The report is understood to have originated with a European intelligence service late last week and to have involved information that a suspected Black September operative was spotted in transit between the Middle East and a European capital in recent days.

State Department officials have refused to discuss the report, and the Secret Service yesterday

turned aside questions with a curt "no comment."

NEVERTHELESS it is reliably reported that the administration is taking the warning seriously and has ordered stringent precautions, especially during the European portions of Kissinger's scheduled trip to NATO headquarters in Brussels, the Middle East and the Middle East peace conference at Geneva.

(The Chicago Daily News reported from London that an extraordinary security operation has been mounted at London's Heathrow airport, where Kissinger is scheduled to arrive later today.

(A U.S. embassy spokesman denied knowledge of any specific threat on Kissinger's life and said "if there was one I wouldn't talk about it."

(But security sources said U.S. security men assigned to protect Kissinger here were being issued submachine guns and that the whole security operation would be "bigger than anything ever used" for President Nixon.

(One source said the beefed-up security operation followed a threat on Kissinger's life "from the other side of the Atlantic," meaning presumably from the United States.

(One security source said Kissinger was being treated as a "high risk VIP.")

According to intelligence sources, various threats

against participants in the Geneva conference, presumably emanating from Palestinian extremist organizations, have been monitored over the past week or so. It was not clear precisely why the reported plot against Kissinger was being treated more seriously than these other rumored threats.

Despite a resolution by the recent Arab summit at Algiers to protect Palestinian interests during the peace talks and admit the Palestinian Liberation Organization as sole representatives of the Palestinians, the prospect of the Geneva parley has regularly been denounced by Palestinian propaganda organs.

EARLY last week, a PLO broadcast over radio Baghdad denounced Kissinger's Middle East peace efforts so far, warned of "grave results that might be achieved by Kissinger's coming visits" and urged unspecified countermea-

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asures as a "national and pan-Arab duty."

Only yesterday, a clandestine broadcast from southern Syria attributed to Abu Iyad, the operational alias of Salah Khalaf, the No. 2 man in the dominant Palestinian group Al Fatah, served notice that the Palestinians would still be heard from even though preparations were going forward for a peace conference.

"If at certain times we have maintained silence

over certain matters," Khalaf declared, "this does not . . . mean that we have departed from our principles. We intend to embarrass others, particularly the Jordanian regime, U.S. imperialism and Israel."

The Palestinians have not been invited to the Geneva peace conference. But Jordan, which claims it is the legitimate party to speak for all Palestinians, is expected to attend.

KHALAF has been publicly identified by Jordanian

officials as the guiding force behind Black September, and American and Israeli intelligence officials have generally accepted this estimate.

The Munich attack on Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games and the kidnapping and murder of U.S. diplomats in Khartoum last spring are both accredited to Khalaf's planning.

While sources here declined to identified the Black September operative whose movement to Europe triggered the recent security alert, he is believed to be an associate of both Khalaf and of Khalil al-Wazir, another Fatah leader who has been linked to terrorist operations. Wazir, under the name Abu Jihad, has been named as a planner of the kidnapping raid a year ago against the Israeli embassy in Bangkok.

Nixon Role in Foreign Policy Is Altered; Some Assert Kissinger Is Now in Charge

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 23—Profound changes have taken place in the way foreign policy is made in the Nixon Administration in the wake of the Watergate scandals and the appointment of Henry A. Kissinger as Secretary of State.

First, the elaborate National Security Council system of making decisions by presenting the President with the facts and the options, so that he is not at the mercy of the bureaucracy, has become less important. The formal committee apparatus of the National Security Council remains intact, but the council itself has not met since Mr. Kissinger became Secretary Sept. 21, and it met only twice before that this year.

A Disputed Interpretation

Second, the President is playing an altered and, some say, a lesser role in the formulation of national security policy.

The effect of the changes, according to a wide variety of senior officials in the State and Defense Departments and in Congress, is that Secretary Kissinger and not President Nixon is running foreign affairs and that the Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, has been left in charge of military affairs.

On the other hand, White House officials, in interviews with The New York Times, have said the conjectures along these lines are politically motivated nonsense aimed at trying to get the President. They say they come from people who

do not know what they are talking about.

"Henry receives and requests instructions from the President before he acts on any issue of importance," one of them said. According to the officials only the President, Mr. Kissinger and Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., the President's chief of staff, know exactly how decisions are made.

The White House officials conceded nevertheless that Mr. Nixon had decentralized national security decision-making. One described the new situation this way: "Given the pros we have in the top jobs now, we can

do with a nod what used to take three hours of discussion."

Mr. Nixon's relationship with his two principal subordinates has become a matter of constant speculation in the bureaucracy and on Capitol Hill. Some Senators and other ranking officials say they have gotten the impression that Mr. Kissinger is now making most of the decisions himself. What annoys the White House most is gossip in the bureaucracy that what is happening is the equivalent of President Lyndon B. Johnson's decision-making

"Tuesday lunches"—only now they are held without the President.

The situation is believed to have arisen because the President's time is consumed by Watergate and other troubles, allowing Mr. Kissinger to "take over."

The White House, asked to provide data on the frequency and length of meetings between the President and his Secretary of State, produced the following cumulative table, covering the period Sept. 1 to Dec. 7:

Days in same locality	45
Number of meetings	92
Telephone conversations	30
Days separated	53
Telephone conversations	38

High Frequency Seen

Present and former officials said the figures represented a high frequency of contact between a President and a Cabinet officer.

High foreign-policy officials described the President and Mr. Kissinger as dealing with their new situation on a tentative basis, but in the meantime the following patterns seem to be emerging:

Mr. Kissinger is occasionally using his committee apparatus, which he still controls as assistant to the President, to keep his hands on defense issues and to circumvent the State Department bureaucracy, which has become his own.

The National Security Council staff, so powerful in the early days of the Administration, is losing influence to intimates whom Mr. Kissinger took with him to the State Department and the Pentagon who are favored by Secretary Schlesinger.

A looser, more informal system for making key decisions is developing between Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger at their "Tuesday lunches," which sometimes occur on Thursdays and sometimes at breakfast.

Three Broad Questions

Three broad questions were asked in the interviews with officials of the White House, the Defense and State Departments, Congress and the N.S.C. staff: What has happened to the formal National Security Council system? How are decisions really being made? How does the Nixon-Kissinger-Schlesinger relationship work?

The National Security Council was established by Congress in 1947 as the key advisory panel to the President on foreign and defense policy. Its statutory members are now the President, Vice President, Sec-

retary of State and Defense Secretary. Statutory advisers to the council are the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, now Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, and the Director of Central Intelligence, now William C. Colby.

Other important figures currently involved in the business of the council are General Haig and Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Mr. Kissinger's deputy on the council staff. On occasion in the past, Attorneys General such as Robert F. Kennedy and John N. Mitchell as well as Secretaries of the Treasury have attended meetings.

Of the Presidents preceding Mr. Nixon, only Dwight D. Eisenhower held fairly regular meetings. The others—Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy and Mr. Johnson, as well as General Eisenhower—basically used the aura that quickly developed about the council to legitimize certain policies that had been worked out in less formal circumstances.

NSSM's (insiders pronounce the term Nissims) issued by the President.

In the first four and three-quarter years of the Nixon Administration, some 200 memos were issued. In the three months since Mr. Kissinger has been at the State Department, only four have been asked for.

Decision Memorandum

Once the staff studies are completed and reviewed by the first-tier committees, they are forwarded to the council. The President then releases a National Security Decision Memorandum.

A typical NSSM might deal with United States policy toward Thailand, presenting the background and the problems and offering three or four alternative courses of action. In the decision memo the President would state that he had chosen and direct that action be taken by the CIA, the Pentagon, or an embassy.

The purpose of the system, as described in a 1970 letter from Mr. Kissinger to Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, was to present the President with "distinct options, together with their pros and cons and implications and costs, rather than a single policy recommendation founded on bureaucratic consensus."

Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger, according to those who helped them construct the system, were really worried about the bureaucracy. They saw it as basically peopled by hostile Democrats and tied to vested interests.

Mr. Kissinger was to create at the White House one of the most powerful staffs in Washington. That staff was to protect the President against the State Department, which was viewed as representing "foreign" interests; against the Pentagon, which was seen as an insatiable consumer of military hardware, and against an intelligence community that rarely saw evil intentions on the part of Moscow and Peking.

A Trickle of Memos

But in recent months, the council has stopped meeting; the memos have dwindled to a trickle and Mr. Kissinger has begun to carry off to the State Department his most trusted aides on the N.S.C. staff.

Former and present council staff members believe that sometimes the system did work to give the President the facts and real options rather than a work according to national security study memorandums, or

particular, were said to be unhappy; they had regarded the system as an institutionalized channel for presenting military views on policy matters. "It's virtually impossible to get our views to Kissinger now," one said.

System Termed Alive

The White House officials disagreed. They did not think the system was dead. They maintained that when General Haig accepted H. R. Haldeman's job as chief of staff at the White House, he proposed that the system be decentralized, and that the President readily agreed.

They said the President decided that "we can do business in more efficient, less formal ways." One of them added: "These guys know the scope, and they know the issues backwards and forwards, but the President still runs the show."

According to the White House sources, Mr. Kissinger has an interest in perpetuating some functions of the National Security Council system since it allows him to do things that a Secretary of State cannot do.

For example, Mr. Kissinger has told many people privately that his main reason for retaining his N.S.C. job is to keep an eye on the defense budget. The defense analysis section of the staff has remained active. However, Mr. Kissinger is not known to have urged a reduction in the over-all level of military spending in the last five years.

The White House officials also acknowledged that Mr. Kissinger had used the council staff to circumvent his subordinates at the State Department. During the recent Arab-Israeli war, he sent messages to Middle Eastern heads of state through the Central Intelligence Agency communications facilities at the White House. The messages were drafted by the council staff, and high State Department officials were unaware of them. They were sent directly to C.I.A. field offices.

Mr. Kissinger also reportedly continues to use C.I.A. channels to transmit messages to Moscow and Peking. These "back-channel" activities persist despite his pledge before becoming Secretary to involve the State Department experts fully in their areas of specialization.

Meanwhile, according to Foreign Service officers, Mr. Kissinger's close associates from the N.S.C.—Winston Lord, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and

fluency in Foggy Bottom.

At the Pentagon, officials said Mr. Schlesinger was also relying on particular individuals rather than a general staff rebuilding process. He seems to favor his special assistants and military assistants along with isolated experts, regardless of rank, they said.

This emphasis on key people and personal relationships rather than committees—not so different from previous Administrations—extends to the top of the ladder, to the Kissinger-Schlesinger relationship.

White House officials have explained, without prompting, that Mr. Kissinger was urged to establish cordial contacts with Mr. Schlesinger because of his poor relations with the previous Secretaries of Defense, Melvin R. Laird and Elliot L. Richardson. One man said Mr. Richardson was particularly miffed at Mr. Kissinger because he had regular lunches with Mr. Clements as a way of working around Mr. Richardson.

Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger try to see each other for lunch or breakfast once a week and talk on the telephone frequently, according to Defense and State Department officials. These sources said that the important business gets done then. White House sources, on the other hand, said they were only "bull sessions."

At the same time, they acknowledged that the President's decentralization edict allowed the new Secretaries more scope than their predecessors had.

One White House official, discussing the idea that Mr. Kissinger is "taking over," said: "I know, I know, it's Henry's style. He makes it sound as if he's in charge." Another nodded, saying, "Henry just overwhelms them."

These officials vigorously insist that the speculation is malicious gossip, emanating from people who do not know the facts and who are out to take away the President's strong suit in foreign affairs. The officials emphasized that Mr. Kissinger attended almost every 8:30 A.M. staff meeting with the President, and then saw him alone later in the morning before leaving for the State Department. They said the two men also talked on the telephone almost daily.

Secretary Schlesinger does not enjoy the same access to the President. White House sources confirmed that he has not seen the President alone at the Pentagon.

DO NOT FORGET THE NEEDLE!

Making Apparent Real

In 1969 President Nixon promised to make the apparent real. On Feb. 7, 1969, the White House announced: "The President indicated that the council will henceforth be the principal forum for the consideration of policy issues."

That year 37 council meetings were called. The number rapidly dwindled to three in 1972 and the two so far in 1973.

In the Hotel Pierre in New York before his inauguration, President-elect Nixon and Mr. Kissinger, who had been designated as his assistant for national security affairs, devised a new system of interagency committees. It was much more elaborate and intricate than the relatively informal system inherited from President Johnson.

All but one of the committees that report directly to the National Security Council are presided over by Mr. Kissinger in his capacity as assistant to the President. The membership of the committees is identical: Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements Jr., Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush, Mr. Colby of the C.I.A. and Admiral Moorer. Mr. Rush heads the under secretaries' committee.

Assistant secretaries of state preside over the interdepartmental and ad hoc groups. They are charged with carrying out the interagency staff work according to national security study memorandums, or